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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
No. 17-1421 
_____________ 
 
SANG GEOUL LEE, 
 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WON IL PARK, MD 
 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(No. 12-cv-07437) 
District Judge:  Honorable Esther Salas 
 
_____________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a): 
December 15, 2017 
_____________ 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, RESTREPO, and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: December 20, 2017) 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 This case originated as a result of the alleged improper disclosure of private 
medical information.  Sang Geoul Lee (“Mr. Lee”) sued his former physician, Won Il 
Park (“Dr. Park”), asserting New Jersey state law claims of negligence per se (Count I), 
negligence (Count II), and breach of confidentiality (Count III).  The United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey granted Dr. Park’s motion for summary 
judgment on all of Mr. Lee’s claims.  Mr. Lee timely filed this appeal, in which he 
challenges: (1) the grant of summary judgment in toto; (2) the procedural mechanism by 
which the District Court granted summary judgment on the breach of confidentiality 
claim; (3) the District Court’s refusal to disqualify opposing counsel for a vulgar 
courtroom outburst; and (4) the District Court’s refusal to grant leave to amend the 
complaint.  For the reasons stated below, we will reverse in part and remand the 
adjudication of Counts II and III to the District Court. 
I. 
 As this Opinion is non-precedential and we write mainly for the parties, our 
factual recitation is abbreviated.  At all relevant times, Mr. Lee was a patient of Dr. Park, 
a medical practitioner in New Jersey.  In 2010, Dr. Park prescribed erectile dysfunction 
pills for Mr. Lee.  Mr. Lee’s then-wife, Kyung Lee (“Mrs. Lee”), was aware that he 
sought and received this treatment; however, Mr. Lee alleges that she only knew about 
his receipt of ten pills for use within their marriage.  He argues that she was initially 
unaware that he procured approximately 160 additional pills, some or all of which he 
used while participating in an extra-marital affair.  Nevertheless, by February 2012, Mrs. 
3 
 
Lee had grown suspicious.  She telephoned Dr. Park, asking about the erectile 
dysfunction pills that he had prescribed.  On the call, Dr. Park revealed that he had 
prescribed the additional 160 pills.  At no point had Mr. Lee consented to the release of 
this information.  After acrimonious legal proceedings, Mr. and Mrs. Lee divorced.  The 
parties dispute whether the divorce would have occurred in the absence of Dr. Park’s 
revelation. 
 On December 4, 2012, Mr. Lee filed the instant action.  Thereafter, on March 7, 
2013, a Magistrate Judge issued a Scheduling Order that permitted Mr. Lee to amend the 
pleadings by June 28, 2013.  Approximately sixteen months after the deadline to amend 
and after discovery had concluded, Mr. Lee filed a motion to amend the complaint.  The 
District Court denied that motion. 
 On September 10, 2014, the parties participated in a settlement conference before 
a Magistrate Judge.  Outside the presence of the judge, counsel for Dr. Park directed a 
vulgar outburst at counsel for Mr. Lee.  We need not recount the exact language that 
counsel employed.  Rather, it suffices to note the fact that he apologized and to relate his 
later assertion that he cannot “justify the vulgarity [he] used in conveying [his] rejection 
of [opposing counsel’s] . . . settlement demand.”  Park Br. 34.  Mr. Lee moved for the 
District Court to disqualify the offending attorney, but the District Court denied the 
motion. 
 Thereafter, Dr. Park moved for summary judgment.  With respect to the 
negligence per se claim, the District Court found that “[b]ecause Plaintiff does not 
identify a statute that specifically imposes tort liability on Defendant, Plaintiff cannot, as 
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a matter of law, succeed on his . . . claim.”  Appendix (“App.”) 790.  The Court 
concluded, regarding the negligence claim, that Mr. Lee “fail[ed] to present a genuine 
issue of material fact that compels trial” based on a finding that “the undisputed facts — 
and all reasonable inference[s] taken from those facts — fail to demonstrate that 
Defendant’s actions were the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s harm.”  App. 791–92.  Noting 
that “both parties failed to address breach of confidentiality,” the Court ordered 
supplemental briefing on the remaining claim.  App. 795.  While the summary judgment 
motion remained pending as to this claim, Mr. Lee moved for reconsideration of the 
partial summary judgment Order.  The District Court ultimately denied that motion and 
granted summary judgment as to the breach of confidentiality claim, noting that Mr. Lee 
had failed to indicate a New Jersey state law basis for that cause of action.  App. 965–66. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  
We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We conduct plenary review of the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment.  Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 
253 (3d Cir. 2010).  We review the District Court’s decisions not to disqualify defense 
counsel and to deny the motion to amend the complaint for abuse of discretion.  United 
States v. Stewart, 185 F.3d 112, 120 (3d Cir. 1999); Garvin v. City of Phila., 354 F.3d 
215, 219 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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III. 
A. 
 The District Court granted Dr. Park’s motion for summary judgment on all counts.  
We will review each count in turn. 
1. 
 In New Jersey, a claim of negligence per se is supported by the violation of a 
statute or regulation, but only when that statute or regulation “serve[s] to impose direct 
tort liability on [the person who offends it.]”  Alloway v. Bradlees, Inc., 723 A.2d 960, 
967 (N.J. 1999).  Mr. Lee has failed to allege the existence of such a statute or regulation.  
He cites N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-22.1 for the proposition that it establishes the doctor-
patient privilege in New Jersey.  Lee Br. 21.  In his appellate brief, Mr. Lee discusses the 
statute as a rule of evidence and does not argue that it provides for a remedy in tort.  Id. at 
21–22.  He likewise fails therein to cite case law finding tort liability under New Jersey 
law for breach of the duty of confidentiality.  Finally, his reply brief fails to address this 
point entirely.  Mr. Park, on the other hand, cites an unpublished district court decision 
for the proposition that “[the statute] is a Rule of Evidence, and there are no indications 
in the statute or in New Jersey case law that it creates an independent cause of action for 
its violation.”1  Park Br. 19. 
We conclude that the issue of whether N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-22.1 provides for 
a remedy in tort is not properly before us.  First, it is the responsibility of neither the 
                                              
1 The case cited was Green v. Cooper Hosp. Univ. Med. Ctr., No. 97-5745, 1997 WL 
749475, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 1997). 
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District Court nor this Court to make the parties’ arguments for them; therefore, we will 
not engage in a freewheeling investigation into New Jersey state law without meaningful 
briefing on the subject.  In addition, Mr. Lee’s failure to respond to the pertinent 
opposition-brief argument acts as a concession of that argument.  See Griswold v. 
Coventry First LLC, 762 F.3d 264, 274 n.8 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting that failure to brief an 
issue on appeal and a related concession at oral argument constitutes a forfeiture of the 
argument); John Wyeth & Bro. Ltd. v. CIGNA Int’l Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1076 n.6 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (noting that “arguments raised in passing . . . but not squarely argued[] are 
considered waived”).  Finally, Mr. Lee’s statement of the issues presented on appeal asks 
specifically whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment on the 
negligence per se claim “in light of the fact dispute whether defendant’s acts and 
omissions were a substantial factor that resulted in plaintiff’s injury.”  Lee Br. 5.  The 
framing of this question for appeal does not include whether the District Court erred in 
concluding that Plaintiff had failed “to identify any statute or regulation that imposes 
direct tort liability on Defendant,” App. 961, or that “there is no indication that [the New 
Jersey statute] creates a private right of action.”  App. 790.  For these reasons, we will 
affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment as to Count I. 
2. 
 Mr. Lee argues that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment on the 
negligence claim.  The District Court “conclude[d] that the undisputed facts fail to show 
that Defendant’s actions were the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s alleged harm, and 
Plaintiff, as the non-moving party, fail[ed] to present a genuine issue of material fact that 
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compels trial.”  App. 791.  Centrally at issue is whether the alleged breach of the duty of 
care regarding confidential information was the proximate cause of injury to Mr. Lee. 
 In New Jersey, “[t]he issue of causation is ordinarily left to the factfinder.”  
Townsend v. Pierre, 110 A.3d 52, 66 (N.J. 2015).  There is an exception, however, “in 
the highly extraordinary case in which reasonable minds could not differ on whether that 
issue has been established.”  Id. (quoting Fluehr v. City of Cape May, 732 A.2d 1035, 
1041 (N.J. 1999)) (emphasis added).  On the facts here, we conclude that reasonable 
minds could differ on the issue of causation.  Mr. Lee’s statement of material facts at 
summary judgment raised evidence tending to put causation at issue.  App. 658–63.  
Further, his related Declaration filed in opposition to summary judgment contains non-
conclusory, factual assertions about the timeline of Mrs. Lee’s conduct.  App. 665–76.  
He provides examples of escalation of animosity and her anger towards him following 
the phone call between Mrs. Lee and Dr. Park, noting in particular that she “came and 
raided his offices [to search for his pills] DEA-style only after she spoke with [Dr.] Park 
and not before.”  App. 669, 674–75.  It is generally true, as the District Court recognized, 
that “conclusory, self-serving affidavits are insufficient to withstand a motion for 
summary judgment.”  Gonzalez v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 678 F.3d 254, 263 
(3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation omitted).  While certain aspects of Mr. Lee’s 
Declaration are conclusory, he also submitted non-conclusory evidence that puts 
causation in question.  Whether charges of sexual infidelity and all of the harm 
encompassed within such charges would have occurred without Dr. Park’s disclosure is 
unclear, and — based on the evidence — reasonable minds could differ as to whether his 
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alleged breach was the proximate cause of Mrs. Lee’s conduct.  For this reason, we will 
reverse the grant of summary judgment as to Count II. 
3. 
 We turn finally to the breach of confidentiality claim.  In its Opinion granting the 
summary judgment motion as to Counts I and II and reserving judgment on the summary 
judgment motion as to Count III, the District Court noted: 
Plaintiff states that the nature of the case is Defendant’s “breach of private 
and privileged medical information,” not whether Defendant caused the 
divorce. . . .  Plaintiff goes on to argue that courts have routinely held that 
defendants can be held liable for disclosure of medical information. . . .  In 
support of this position, Plaintiff cites numerous cases—all of which are 
inapposite to the instant case. 
 Count Three of Plaintiff’s Complaint is for breach of confidentiality, 
presumably under New Jersey law.  Nevertheless, Plaintiff cites to cases 
involving claims of invasion of privacy, defamation, and negligence in 
jurisdictions outside of New Jersey.  The one New Jersey state court case that 
Plaintiff does cite is an invasion of privacy case outside the medical 
information context. 
App. 795.  This characterization misapprehends Mr. Lee’s position.  While the District 
Court accurately describes his briefing, it neglects to observe that the complaint itself 
provides a New Jersey state law basis for the claim — Stempler v. Speidell, 495 A.2d 
857, 861 (N.J. 1985) — which notes that “a physician could be held liable for a breach of 
the obligation of confidentiality.”  More recent New Jersey cases also recognize potential 
liability for damages stemming from a physician’s breach of this duty.  See Smith v. 
Datla, 164 A.3d 1110, 1122–23 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017) (noting that “physicians 
are [] under a common law duty to maintain the confidentiality of patient records and 
information” and that liability could ensue from a breach); Crescenzo v. Crane, 796 A.2d 
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283, 289, 291 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (noting the same); Estate of Behringer v. 
Med. Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251, 1255, 1273–74 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991) 
(noting the same). 
 It is curious that Mr. Lee’s counsel cited a New Jersey state law basis for Count III 
in the complaint but neglected to cite it in briefs before the District Court or this Court — 
particularly because the grant of summary judgment was based entirely on the failure to 
cite relevant state law.  Nevertheless, because Mr. Lee asserted a valid legal basis for the 
cause of action in his complaint, we will reverse. 
B. 
 Mr. Lee also argues that the District Court committed procedural error in granting 
summary judgment on Count III — the claim for breach of confidentiality.  Because we 
are remanding consideration of Count III on other grounds, we need not consider this 
argument. 
C. 
 Mr. Lee contends that the District Court committed reversible error in declining to 
disqualify opposing counsel following his vulgar outburst at a settlement conference.  We 
disagree.  It is well-established that district courts are empowered with “inherent 
authority to supervise the professional conduct of attorneys appearing before it.”  United 
States v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198, 1201 (3d Cir. 1980); see also Republic of Philippines v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 74 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that “a district court 
must ensure that there is an adequate factual predicate for flexing its substantial muscle 
under its inherent powers, and must also ensure that the sanction is tailored to address the 
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harm identified”).  Such management of litigation and oversight of litigants is best left to 
the discretion of the District Judge, and the record in this case exhibits no abuse of 
discretion.  At the status conference of May 26, 2015, the District Court reached its 
decision after considering the situation and taking into account the offending attorney’s 
history and apology.  App. 407–08.  We see no reason to reverse that decision on appeal. 
D. 
Finally, Mr. Lee also argues that the District Court erred in refusing to grant leave 
to amend the complaint.  Again, that argument must fail.  Where a scheduling order 
governs amendment of the pleadings, that order “may be modified only for good cause 
and with the judge’s consent.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4).  Thus, in such instances, the 
lenient Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) standard that “[t]he court should freely give leave when 
justice so requires” yields to the good cause requirement.  See, e.g., Holmes v. Grubman, 
568 F.3d 329, 334–35 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that “where . . . a scheduling order governs 
amendments to the complaint . . . ‘the lenient standard under Rule 15(a) . . . must be 
balanced against the [good cause] requirement under Rule 16(b)’”); DRK Photo v. 
McGraw-Hill Global Educ. Holdings, LLC, 870 F.3d 978, 989 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting 
that “where . . . a party seeks leave to amend after the deadline set in the scheduling order 
has passed, the party’s request is judged under [Rule] 16’s ‘good cause’ standard rather 
than the ‘liberal amendment policy’ of [Rule] 15”).  Mr. Lee sought to amend the 
complaint approximately sixteen months after the relevant scheduling order’s deadline to 
amend.  He did not allege that he had recently learned of new information or even offer 
new facts — rather, he simply wanted to add a new cause of action based on the same 
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facts found within the initial complaint.  It is self-evident that Mr. Lee was not diligent in 
seeking amendment, and the District Court did not err in denying the motion to amend 
the complaint. 
IV. 
 For the reasons stated above, we will reverse and remand the matter to the District 
Court with respect to Counts II and III, and we will affirm in all other respects. 
